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ealing with stockpiles of surplus ammunition1 remains a key challenge for many African countries. In
the last 10 years, at least 38 ammunition sites across
Africa reportedly experienced unplanned explosions, causing
injury and loss of life as well as significant damage to infrastructure and the environment.2 Numerous reasons such as
overstocking, inadequate storage facilities due to insufficient
resources, inadequate capabilities of storage sites, or simply
unstable ammunition may be the cause of these unplanned
detonations. These factors are often exacerbated by personnel having a limited knowledge and awareness, or insufficient
training on relevant subjects such as explosive compatibility
groups or ammunition life cycles. Regardless of the reasons
outlined previously, the destruction of surplus and/or deteriorating ammunition is required as part of a general physical

security and stockpile management (PSSM) regime, in particular to reduce the risk of unplanned explosions at ammunitions sites (UEMS).
During the past decade the international community provided substantial funding for surplus destruction activities
to countries in sub-Saharan Africa. However, this funding
was primarily used by external implementing agencies to destroy existing stockpiles, rather than equipping the countries
in which destruction activities are undertaken with the skill
sets and tools to manage their own destruction programs,
thus lessening their dependence on foreign expertise. This
article is therefore meant to encourage donors, implementing
agencies, and beneficiaries to consider interventions through
a more locally sustainable lens and involve local parties more
inclusively in the design and implementation of ammunition

(Above) Degraded and dysfunctional ammunition is often stored in munition depots across the continent despite its
unserviceability. Reasons for the storage of degraded ammunition are due to limited awareness, care, or destruction
capacities.
All images courtesy of Nikhil Acharya, BICC.
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destruction processes. In order to affect a real change in surplus ammunition management, it is not enough to just deal
with existing surplus stockpiles; the community needs to ensure that partnering countries are able to independently prevent the future buildup of surplus stockpiles.
This article draws attention to the common procedures and
practices of implementing agencies, partnering countries,
and donors, before outlining lessons learned and suggesting
potential ways of creating more participatory, sustainable,
surplus-destruction projects across Africa.

ISSUES WITH CURRENT APPROACHES TO
THE MANAGEMENT AND DESTRUCTION
OF SURPLUS MUNITION
The need for local ownership over the management and
destruction processes of surplus stockpiles of ammunition is
reflected in myriad reports, international best practice standards, as well as relevant legal instruments in this field including the Bamako Declaration Article 3(iv);3 the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention
Article 17;4 Kinshasa Convention Article 14; Nairobi
Protocol Article 80;6 and the Silencing the Guns Continental
Plan of Action on the Control of Illicit Small Arms and
Light Weapons. The International Ammunition Technical
Guidelines implicitly call for the development of local capabilities in this area (10.2.5 and 10.2.6),7 and external implementing partners conduct relatively short-term training and
capacity-building projects. However this often happens in an
ad hoc manner, depending on the nature, scale, resources of
the intervention, and strategic priorities of the donors, and is
not always approached with considerations of long-term sustainability in mind.
There is a need and desire for the skills and infrastructure
gaps in this area to be filled by local, national, and regional bodies. This is needed in order to address the issue of ammunition destruction at an early enough stage to prevent the
build-up of surpluses before they become a security and safety
threat to the state and civilian population in the surrounding
areas. For this to occur the capabilities must be developed and
maintained at the local, national, or regional levels.
Short-term projects and interventions may fail to address
related gaps in management and destruction processes outside of the narrow timeframe in which the implementing
agencies operate. These capability gaps stem partly from the
way in which donors operate. Thorough ammunition-lifecycle management is an expensive and time-consuming process, thus donors tend to favor short-term projects focusing on
the destruction of specific stockpiles. As well as limiting the
possibilities of embedding a national system capable of identifying and destroying surpluses or degraded ammunition,

interventions may only focus on parts of the destruction requirements that a country needs. This approach may be driven
by a number of factors including the issue that implementing
agencies will follow donor parameters and focus purely on the
material destruction of ammunition instead of devoting the
necessary time and expertise to building capacity of the local
technical staff and decision makers.
Additionally, countries often request assistance that is limited to expensive infrastructure or equipment procurement.
For donors, assistance with actual destruction activities is
comparatively cheaper; however, capacity development, risk
awareness education, and the development of locally applicable tools and institutional learning to generate knowledge
for domestic security agencies are being neglected.7 Although
the provision of relevant equipment is often a necessary component of destruction programs, such equipment is often not
used or maintained once the intervention from the implementing agency or donor concludes. This in turn decreases
the likelihood of future funding, as donors question the commitment of the recipient. Countries receiving support should
therefore not be passively involved in the implementation of
activities by foreign intervention agencies but must operate in
true partnership with them by actively taking part in the design and implementation processes.
These approaches may lead to uneven coverage of destruction activities, with assistance being concentrated in certain regions and focusing on specific types of intervention.
These interventions may be more attractive from a short-term
“marketing” perspective, producing swift, publicly verifiable
outputs rather than more anonymous long-term benefits.
Assistance measures therefore often support physical measures such as the destruction of surplus ammunition or the
construction/rehabilitation of ammunition sites in countries
that are already of interest to the international community rather than those with more basic infrastructure or with
complex bureaucracies. It is therefore the case that funding
tends to cluster around prominently positioned countries who
may not be able to absorb the assistance provided while other
countries with similar or higher demands command less attention and do not receive assistance in overcoming existing
difficulties relating to surplus destruction.
The questions of strategic relationships and/or geopolitical
dynamics also feed into determining which states may benefit
from intervention support. These points all have the potential to create a cyclical knock-on effect: countries who do not
receive support focus less on the very governance issues such
as ammunition management and capacity that deter donors
from investing in the first place. Therefore better coordination is needed between donors and established African institutions, such as the African Union, the Regional Economic
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Surplus and damaged RPG warheads. These explosives pose a serious
threat to the lives of storage keepers, military personnel, and
civilians. By separating and destroying surplus ammunition,
UEMS can be reduced significantly.

Communities, or regional bodies to avoid duplication and ineffectiveness of the support provided. Apart from inefficiency, duplication of efforts by different agencies and their donors
might even hamper progress by creating competition among
implementing agencies and undermining national ownership.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE INTERVENTIONS
As discussed, interventions are focused on the destruction of ammunition through external implementing agents.
However, this approach may only relieve the burden for a short
period of time, failing in the longer term to address broader
questions relating to the material conditions and management
activities undertaken in the intervention countries. These potential gaps ultimately result in the formation of a dependency
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cycle of ongoing external interventions for ammunition surplus destruction. Therefore in order to lessen the dependence
of beneficiary states on repeated interventions from external donors and to allow states to overcome UEMS caused by
overcrowded unstable stockpile depots the following changes
in approach are proposed.
Implementing agencies must work more closely with respective countries in the design and execution of surplus
destruction programs. Rather than treating surplus destruction as an activity in isolation, states and implementing agencies may consider the design and establishment of
joint, tailored, life-cycle-management systems for ammunition in accordance with international standards. Using this
broader approach would involve the inclusion of PSSM into

the national curricula of relevant security forces, the development of specific policies relating to management systems,
as well as the introduction and implementation of functional
standard operating procedures, all of which are necessary to
generate functioning surplus munition destruction capabilities. This is crucial, as long-term threat mitigation of surplus
ammunition can only realistically happen through improving and streamlining the acquisition, distribution, and disposal processes of ammunition. This has the double benefit of
reducing both the costs and the risks around surplus stockpiles, which then require further interventions to resolve.
Additionally, specialized and explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) capacities and equipment must be acquired in order to
build in-country capabilities.
The onus to ensure sustainability cannot solely be the donors’; beneficiary countries must also follow through on the
commitments they give to donors. Each state has an individual obligation to limit the risks and hazards of ammunition stockpiles, both to personnel working directly on those
sites as well as civilians living in the surrounding areas. States
should thus be obliged to report on their own activities in this
area on a regular and standardized basis and should actively
seek ways to mitigate potential risks at an early stage, rather than ignoring the issues posed by increasing stockpiles.9
Reports should be publicly available and aimed at donors, relevant international mechanisms as well as stakeholders and
implementing agencies.
For countries with capacity and capability issues where it
may not be possible to develop or maintain EOD or arms and
ammunition destruction expertise, states should request support from regional economic communities and regional bodies dealing with these subjects to establish regional pools of
experts—such as train-the-trainers programs to support
national surplus management and disposal undertakings.
Promising examples of the approaches that may be used can
be drawn from the activities of ECOWAS and the Regional
Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of
Africa and Bordering States in their PSSM train-the-trainers
programs.
Donor countries and institutions are bound to short-term,
high-impact timelines. Projects are thus often commissioned
for only two-to-three years. Sustainable change is, however,
not achieved in such a short time frame; changing personnel
and institutional behavior requires time to adjust. Therefore,
donors should consider committing to selected projects for a
longer period of time, rather than distributing available funding across a larger number of countries for shorter periods. In
order to allow partnering countries to overcome surplus
stockpiles and the dependency on external actors in driving
interventions, priority should be given to supporting

partnering countries in combating the root causes of surplus
accumulation. This would decrease the dependency on foreign
financial resources and capacities, a situation that is clearly in
the interest of all donors, as financial resources can be channeled into a sustainable solution, rather than a quick fix, thus
representing more bang for donors (and taxpayers) buck than
the current situation allows.
See endnotes page 63
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